OKPE UNION AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF NIGERIA

OKPE UNION AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF NIGERIA

By

Prof. O. Igho Natufe

President General

Okpe Union

October 13, 2022

INTRODUCTION

Okpe is one of the more than 400 ethnic nationalities that constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Conceptually, these ethnic nationalities, including Okpe, are the core federating units of Nigeria. Since the amalgamation of the Southern Protectorates and the Colony of Lagos with the Northern Protectorates by the British Government to form Nigeria on January 1, 1914, the country has been beset by numerous problems as its leaders continuously fail to construct and operate a viable political system, thus giving rise to increased sense of disenfranchisement by a vast proportion of the population, gross insecurity and demand for restructuring the federal system.

Apart from the Colony of Lagos, the protectorates were never colonies of Britain. While the series of “treaties of protection” signed between Britain and the various ethnic nationalities and states were intended to grant Britain exclusive trade rights, the treaties never meant the extinguishment of the independence of these states and ethnic nationalities.  For them, these “treaties of protection” merely granted Britain a status of a preferred trading partner and not a termination of their independence status. The amalgamation of 1914 was executed without the consent of the independent ethnic nationalities. This begs the question about the legality of the 1914 amalgamation.

Nigeria’s founding fathers had negative opinions about the 1914 amalgamation and doubted the unity of Nigeria. Speaking in the Northern House of Assembly in 1952, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who later became the Prime Minister of Nigeria (1960-1966), dismissed the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria. He opined:

“…the Southern people who are swarming into this region daily in large numbers are really intruders. We don`t want them and they are not welcome here in the North. Since the amalgamation in 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people are different in every way including religion, custom, language and aspiration. The fact that we`re all Africans might have misguided the British Government. We here in the North, take it that `Nigerian unity` is not for us. (As cited by Adisa Adeleye, “AMALGAMATION OF 1914: Was it a mistake?”, Vanguard, Lagos. May 18, 2012.)

Before Balewa, writing in 1947, Obafemi Awolowo had described the amalgamation as a construct of British “treaties of dubious validity” (Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, London, 1947, p.24), while Ahmadu Bello in 1953 referred to the amalgamation as “the mistake of 1914.” (Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, My Life, London, 1962, pp. 126 & 133).  In 1964, Nnamdi Azikiwe described “Nigerian unity” as “only a British invention. It is better for us and many admirers abroad that we should disintegrate in peace and not in pieces.” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIIFvkvkmNC8) Later, Richard Akinjide, who served as Education Minister in Balewa’s cabinet, referred to the amalgamation as a “fraud.” (Richard Akinjide, QC, SAN, “The Amalgamation Of Nigeria Was A Fraud”, July 9, 2000, http://www.unitedijaw.com/amalgamation.htm).

It is instructive to note that the views of these past leaders still echo in the consciousness of Nigerians, who have been grappling with how to rectify the amalgamation “treaties of dubious validity”, the “mistake of 1914”, and the “fraud” of 1914.  Or, as Azikiwe interrogated, should we “disintegrate in peace and not in pieces?” These questions have defined the discussions on the future of Nigeria, especially since the end of the 1967-1970 civil war. There is a general clamour for a renewed federalism, that is a restructuring of the federal system, as a panacea of Nigeria’s dysfunctionality. However, while there are millions of admirers of restructuring, there is no unanimity on the concept of restructuring.  How do we restructure contemporary Nigeria?  To frame it differently, how do we restructure contemporary Nigeria to respect the sovereignty of the core federating units, including the Okpe?

THE ISSUE

When the Richards Constitution (named after Governor Arthur Richards) of 1946 divided the country into three regions by splitting the South into two – East and West – and leaving the North as a single entity, it recognized the suzerainty of the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani in the East, West, and North respectively. (NOTE: The Hausa/Fulani appellation is used as a single group anchored on Islamism led by the minority Fulani in the midst of a Hausa majority). These three major ethnic nationalities considered the respective regions as their fiefdoms and, by implication; the other ethnic nationalities in each of the regions were subsumed under the ideological prism of the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani. Thus, Nigeria gradually and systematically evolved into a battle ground for the struggle for power and influence featuring the three major ethnic nationalities. While the amalgamation of 1914 extinguished the sovereignty of ethnic nationalities that constituted Nigeria, the Richards Constitution of 1946 consigned the minority ethnic nationalities into a state of permanent selfdom under the authority of the Hausa/Fulani-Igbo-Yoruba tripodal hegemony.

Nigeria is currently facing an existential crisis facilitated by the failure of its leaders to successfully grapple with the problems of nation-building in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity. Since the past two decades, the federal government has systematically forfeited its responsibility of guaranteeing the well-being and security of Nigerians, as bandits and terrorists have become a parallel government in the country, especially in several states in Northern Nigeria where kidnapping, raping and killing of thousands of persons with some of them be-headed and burnt, have become an accepted practice. The challenges facing Nigeria can be summarized as follows: –

1. To extricate itself from the anomalies of the 1914 amalgamation.
2. The mismanagement of ethnic and religious relations.
3. The theft and privatization of public wealth by the bureaucratic and political class.
4. The impoverishment of the population.
5. The increasing perception of discrimination and marginalization by various ethnic nationalities.
6. The distortion of federalism.
7. The creeping influence of centrifugal forces.
8. The gradual islamization of Nigeria.
9. The mistrust of the ruling class.
10. The shadow of Biafra.

Nigeria’s minority ethnic nationalities are crushed under the weight of the above problems. This is evident in the onslaught of minority ethnic nationalities in the middle belt, and the arrogant inclusion of southern minority ethnic nationalities in the Biafran and Oduduwa Republic maps produced by the Igbo and Yoruba, respectively.

RESOLVING THE ISSUE

Since 1960 Nigerians have muddled their way through the above without establishing a viable platform for political stability and nation-building. In this process, the Nigerian edifice has crumbled due to prolonged neglect and structural dislocations. The issues enumerated above vividly illustrate this point.

To restructure is to rearrange or reorganize or reshuffle or to redistribute the properties or components of a phenomenon. The primary purpose of restructuring a polity like Nigeria is to establish a measure of equilibrium, equity, fairness and justice to all parties concerned, anchored on their respective independence in core areas of jurisdiction.

Prior to independence in 1960, the demand for state creation for Nigeria’s ethnic minority nationalities was meant to restructure the polity by freeing them from the marginalization which they faced in each of the three regions dominated by the tripodal hegemony.  This issue was the key theme at a post-Richards national constitutional conference convened in Ibadan in January 1950 under Governor John MacPherson. To help focus the deliberations at the Ibadan Conference, H. M. Foot, the Chief Secretary posed two vital questions for the consideration of the delegates.

1. “Do we wish to see a fully centralized system with all legislative and executive power mainly concentrated at the centre or do we wish to develop a federal system under which each different region of the country would exercise a measure of internal autonomy?”
2. “If we favour a federal system, should we retain the existing regions with some modifications of existing regional boundaries or should we form regions on some new basis such as the many linguistic groups which exist in Nigeria?” (As cited in Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria, London, 1961, p.110.)

The second part of the question regarding the creation of regions (states) for the various ethnic groups recognized that the Nigerian polity had become a prison for minority ethnic nationalities. Unfortunately, only the Midwest Region was created via a referendum on August 9, 1963 under a civilian regime. The Action Group (AG) crisis of 1962 that led to a new governing party in the Western Region that was hostile to the AG’s opposition to the Midwest state creation, facilitated the creation of the Midwest Region. Building on the 1950 constitutional conference, the 1954 Constitution recognized the independence of the federating units to manage their respective economy. This was also reflected in the 1963 Republican Constitution, which was the same as the 1960 version, except for the inclusion of the Midwest Region which was excised from the Western Region in August 1963 following a referendum. However, it is instructive to note that, under various military dictatorships, the rationale for state creation deviated from this fundamental and became an instrument for the balkanization of the tripodal hegemonic group into multiple states.

Since 1914 Nigeria has been restructured in quest of a better political order. The British amalgamation of 1914 structured Nigeria into three components: the Colony of Lagos, the Southern Protectorates, and the Northern Protectorates. After that, Nigeria has been restructured seven times as follows: –

1. Three Regions (East; North; and West) from the Richards Constitution to 1963.
2. Four Regions (East; Midwest; North; and West. 1963-1967. (Under an elected civilian government).
3. Twelve States. 1967-1976. (Under a military dictatorship.)
4. Nineteen States. 1976-1987. (Under a military dictatorship.)
5. Twenty-one States plus a Federal Territory of Abuja. 1987-1991. (Under a military dictatorship.)
6. Thirty States. 1991-1996. (Under a military dictatorship.)
7. Thirty-six States. Since 1996. (Under a military dictatorship.)

Irrespective of the above series of restructuring, the clamour for further restructuring continues to define political debate in Nigeria. The proponents of restructuring differ on its form and content. While a faction views restructuring as a return to the tenets of federalism in pre-January 1966 Nigeria anchored on the 1963 Constitution, a second faction argues for the convocation of a (sovereign) national conference to determine the base and structure of a new Nigeria, while a third faction regards restructuring as a conversion of the existing six geopolitical zones into federating units, etc. Furthermore, the report of the 2014 National Conference proposed the creation of additional 18 states in its response to restructuring, to bring the total number of states to 54.

Exponents of this 54-state idea based their argument on the population of Nigeria vis-à-vis that of the United States of America (USA) with 50 states.  A major fault of this comparison is that none of the territories of US states has been divided into chunks since they joined the USA, and neither have the Canadian provinces been sliced into several provinces since they joined the Canadian federal system. Federating units are not defined by size and population. If that were a determinant, California (1850), Connecticut (1788), Massachusetts (1788), New York (1788), and Pennsylvania (1787) would have been sliced into dozens of states, just as the Canadian provinces of Alberta (1905), British Columbia (1871), Manitoba (1870), Ontario (1867), Quebec (1867), for example, would have been balkanized into dozens of provinces since they joined the US and Canadian federations, respectively. 

Basically, to restructure a political system is to reform its components and redefine the relationships governing the powers and responsibilities of all levels of government. Especially in a supposedly federal system like Nigeria, such a restructuring is expected to recognize the exclusive jurisdictions of the federating units in critical sectors of industry and the economy as evidenced in the 1963 Constitution. The resistance to this has been very loud, as the opposition perceives restructuring as a code name for the dissolution of Nigeria. In fact, those arguing for 54 or more states in Nigeria and opposed to restructuring are primarily concerned about forfeiting their fiscal benefits of the current distorted federal system that allows them to collect monthly payments from Abuja.

The political-military class in power since 1966 has jettisoned the federal principles of the 1963 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in favour of a unitary political system, even though they christened the 1999 constitution a federal republican constitution. Ironically, the United Kingdom, a unitary system possesses more federalism compliant institutions than a supposedly Federal Republic of Nigeria. For example, political parties in the United Kingdom are federalism compliant unlike the military imposed command system that defines the form and content of Nigerian political parties. This military imposed command system has permeated all levels of governance including the state, local and traditional systems.

The requirement for a political party in Nigeria to have offices and members in a given number of states before being accorded recognition is anti-federalism.  If Scotland were a state in Nigeria, for instance, it would not have its Scottish National Party (SNP). Whereas, in pre-January 1966 Nigeria, there were regional political parties in accordance with the federal principle.  We had Borno Youth Movement (BYM), Igala Union (IU), Kano People’s Party (KPP), Mabolaje Grand Alliance (MGA), Midwest Democratic Front (MDF), Niger Delta Congress (NDC), Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), and Zamfara Commoners Party (ZCP), etc. In fact, at their inception, both the Action Group (AG) and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) were ethno-regional political parties. Only the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons – later National Council of Nigerian Citizens after Southern Cameroon ceded from Nigeria after its referendum of 1961 – (NCNC) was a national political party at its inception.

Embedded in the concept of restructuring is the notion of marginalization which several ethnic nationalities claim has been their ill-fortune in contemporary Nigeria. Even though it is a member of the tripodal hegemony, the Igbo have been most vociferous in claiming to be marginalized in Nigeria, a phenomenon which has given momentum to their agitation for an independent Biafra. 

It must be emphasized that restructuring by itself does not guarantee an end to marginalization in Nigeria. In each local government area and in each state across Nigeria, there are communities marginalized out of the mainstream by leaders and political parties comprised of members of the same ethnic and religious groups. This is one of the reasons that the series of restructuring itemized above have failed to ensure political stability in Nigeria. What we have is a poor governance across all levels of government, including the traditional system, anchored on massive corruption.

While it may be fashionable to condemn the military regimes for restructuring Nigeria via their respective state creation exercises between 1967 and 1996, it is most disturbing that the elected civilian governments (1979-1983; and since 1999) have failed to address the issue in a meaningful way to halt the various centrifugal forces in the country. For example, their refusal to restore the 1963 Republican Constitution and jettison the 1999 Constitution, which is essentially a militarized command-system constitution, can only be construed as a rejection of restructuring.

Furthermore, restructuring is becoming an obsolete concept particularly as its proponents have been unable to submit a definitive proposal for the restructuring of Nigeria. Does restructuring mean a return to the pre-January 15, 1966 federal structure? Does it mean a restoration of the 1963 Republican Constitution for the current 36 state federating units? Does it mean the creation of more states? Does it mean resource control? Does it mean the conversion of the current 36 states into 6 or 8 or 10 geopolitical regional federating units? Which body determines the form and content of restructuring? Is it the National Assembly or a duly convened national conference of all ethnic nationalities? Our preference is for a duly convened national conference of all ethnic nationalities.

When the leadership of a government fails to clearly articulate the form and content of its policy agenda, it creates a platform for the emergence of an alternative path. Mikhael Gorbachev experienced this with his ill-defined perestroika (restructuring) policy that contributed significantly to the collapse of the Soviet Union. (See, O. Igho Natufe, Russian Foreign Policy: In Search Of Lost Influence, URSS Press, Moscow, 2015. Chapter One: The Collapse of the Soviet Union.) Like the Soviet Union where the government spear-headed restructuring and failed, the Nigerian government’s indifference to restructuring can also produce a similar result to that of the Soviet Union.   

But if restructuring is to succeed in Nigeria, there must be a universal recognition of the tenets of federalism as contained in the 1963 Constitution. Nigerian federalism in the pre-January 1966 period respected the jurisdictions of the federating units in key areas, including revenue derivation, agriculture and local police force. Each of the then four federating units had its own constitution, emblem and flag. In a federal system, both levels of government – the central government and the states (federating units) – are independent, but never subordinate to one another, and the relationship between both is horizontal and not vertical. Based on this federal principle, federating units exercise exclusive jurisdictions over their economy and the exploitation, exploration and marketing of its natural resources, and decide on which of their powers they would each concede to the federal government, excluding defense, custom, and foreign policy which reside under exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. This cardinal principle must be sacrosanct in any discussion on restructuring otherwise we are engaged in a perennial futile exercise. As noted elsewhere: “There is a federation because federating units agree to federate”. (O. Igho Natufe, Governance and Politics in Nigeria, A Lecture Presented at the Staff and Graduate Seminar, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria, November 21, 2006, p.17.)

While the 1960 (Independence) and 1963 (Republican) Constitution did not grant the Regions exclusive rights on minerals, mining, and oil and gas, for example, since the federal government simply assumed this function as a carry-over from the British colonial Minerals Act of 1947, the derivation principle did however compensate for that by allocating 50% to the Regions of origin as well as these regions sharing in the 30% distributable pool, while the federal government had 20%. This is a vital component of any discussion of the form and content of a federal structure. Therefore, a renewed Nigerian federalism must return to the tenets of federalism as contained in the 1963 Constitution, with all the powers accorded the then Regions and the derivation principle of at least 50%, including the right of its own Police Force, etc. Secondly, it must be recognized that a federal government has no jurisdiction to dictate the number of local government councils in a federal polity. This item is an exclusive jurisdiction of the federating units. Only a state government can establish local governments within its territory. The current practice whereby the Federal Government establishes local government councils, inserts them in the constitution and considers the number of local government councils in allocating revenue to respective states is therefore nebulous and moribund.

Since federating units decide on which of their powers to concede to the central (federal) government, they can elect to repeal the federal government’s usurpation of the British colonial Minerals Act of 1947 and replace it with wordings similar to section 92A of the Constitution of Canada, which states as follows:  

“92A.

1. Laws respecting non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy in each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to a. exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province; b. development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary production therefrom; and c. development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy.

2. Export from provinces of resources. In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the export from the province to another part of Canada of the primary production from non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and the production from facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy, but such laws may not authorize or provide for discrimination in prices or in supplies exported to another part of Canada.”

It is pertinent to note that the above has been in existence since 1867 when the four founding provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec) signed the British North America Act that established Canada’s Constitution, which was last reviewed in 2011.

Assuming that the prerequisites for restructuring in the above paragraphs are accepted; then a key question to be resolved is on the number of states (federating units) in a restructured Nigerian federalism. Given that Nigeria is a collection of ethnic nationalities, it is vital that a restructured Nigerian federalism must reflect this imperative. The state creation imposed on the country by various military dictatorships (1967, 1976, 1987, 1991, and 1996) merely balkanized the three major ethnic groups into states. Thus, by military fiat, the Hausa/Fulani have 10 states, the Yorubas have 7, and the Igbo have 5. This military fiat must be discarded. 

Therefore, as a framework for a restructured federal Nigeria, we propose the following: –

1. The creation of homogeneous federating states for the 15 most populous ethnic nationalities that have contiguous boundaries, respectively. These federating units will be 15 homogeneous ethnic-based states for the Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw, Kanuri, Fulani, Ibibio, Okpe, Tiv, etc.
2. The creation of a maximum of 15 heterogeneous (multi-ethnic) federating states for the other ethnic nationalities. An ethnic nationality occupying a defined contiguous boundary in a heterogeneous state shall constitute an autonomous region with due constitutional jurisdictions. It shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with the heterogeneous state over natural resources discovered in its territory; but shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over primary and secondary education, culture, language, and traditional institutions.
3. A Charter of Rights and Freedoms protecting minority rights will anchor this restructured federalism. 

If the proposed homogeneous and heterogeneous federating units are rejected in favour of the existing 36 states, then it is recommended that a distinct ethnic nationality occupying a defined contiguous territory under its own monarch, like, in alphabetical order, the Bini, Itsekiri, Nupe, and Okpe, for example, be classified as an autonomous region with due constitutional jurisdictions to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the state over national resources in its territory; but shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over primary and secondary education, culture, language, and traditional institutions. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is an understatement to say that Nigeria is at a precipice. When Governor Nasiru El-Rufai of Kaduna State recently declared that the Fulani bandits have constituted themselves as an alternate government in his state, we did not need any further acknowledgement of the collapse of government in Nigeria. Nigerians are aware of how these Fulanis, alleged to be non-Nigerians, were imported into the country to assist a political party during the 2015 elections. It is an open secret that these bandits gained access to AK47 weapons due the facilitation of government officials and prominent members of a particular political party. The fact that these bandits are not disarmed, arrested and prosecuted, even though their whereabouts are known to the federal and state governments, exposes the duplicitous characteristics of the federal and state governments where these bandits operate as an alternate government. It is also suspiciously inexplicable that the federal government granted Katsina State the license to arm its vigilante groups with sophisticated AK47 weapons, while Ondo State was denied.

The federal government’s incompetence in managing the security architecture and its gross mismanagement of the national economy, coupled with the theft and privatization of public wealth by the bureaucratic-political class have thrown Nigeria into an unprecedented crisis.  The national currency, Naira, has taken a free fall while the youth unemployment rate has hit the roof.

Is there a chance that a compromise can be reached to save Nigeria from collapsing? But such a compromise must be anchored on realism and not on the use of force by insisting on the “indivisibility” of Nigeria, as to do so will only accelerate the disintegration of the country. The only avenue left for Nigeria is for its leaders to repeal the 1999 Constitution and restore the 1963 Constitution with the States enjoying the same powers and jurisdictions accorded to the Regions in pre-January 1966 Nigeria, including a return to the 1964 revenue allocation formula. The monthly trip of state governors to Abuja to collect allowances from the federal government must end; and if part of the compromise is to retain the current 36 states, it is vital that they must begin to learn to survive within the boundaries of their respective internally generated revenues, instead of relying on crude oil money from oil producing states. On the alternative, contiguous states may consider merging. Creating more states as envisioned in the report of the 2014 National Conference is a senseless enterprise.

There are several missing pages in the discussion of restructuring in Nigeria. One of them is the salary structure of public institutions. It is preposterous and unrealistic to impose a unitary salary structure on a federal polity. Under the Ibrahim Babangida military regime, a Nigerian delegation visited several federations, including Canada in the winter of 1992/93, to enquire about how this issue is dealt with in other federal states. The delegation visited Australia, the USA and Canada. They discovered that in each of the countries visited, the salary structure of the federal government differs from that of each federating unit, just as each federating unit has its own salary structure different from that of other federating units. Even the salary of university teachers differs from university to university, as well as between faculties/departments within the same university. Did the delegation submit its findings and recommendations to the Babangida regime? If so, what did the Babangida regime do with the findings of the delegation? 

Another key issue is the monolithic structure of Nigerian political parties. A political party must be federalism compliant in a federal system. Thus, it is anti- federalism that a supposedly federal polity like Nigeria has a monolithic political party structure. This is a gross distortion of federalism. In a federal political system, the state affiliate or chapter of a political party is not subservient to the national executive committee (NEC) of the same party. It is an independent entity. 

Similarly, it is incongruous to have a national electoral commission to be responsible for conducting governorship and parliamentary elections in a state. Each state must have its own electoral commission.

Any serious attempt at restructuring must rectify the above anomalies. The three major ethnic groups must not assume that their numerical advantage grants them the right to dictate restructuring terms. And any attempt to impose a “national” policy on the federating units, for example, by declaring the entire country a cattle-grazing zone, is a recipe for disaster.

Nigerian leaders need to rise to the occasion by being statesmen and take decisive actions to save the country from disintegration. They have to consider the universal interest of Nigeria over the particular interests of their respective ethnic groups. In short, they have to learn to lose a part of themselves in order to gain, as taught by the dialectical principle of negation of the negation. This demands bold leadership, a quality which has been sadly absent in Nigeria. Restoring the 1963 Constitution and the 1964 revenue allocation formula will underline that boldness. Tinkering with the 1999 Constitution, which is fundamentally a unitary constitution based on the military-command system, is not a viable option. 

Where political leaders fail to agree on restructuring, then they render dissolution of the country inevitable. If dissolution is the desired option, we expect a combination of entities to coalesce, if they so choose, in constructing their respective countries. Thus, from the ruins of the present Nigeria can emerge several independent countries, following the peaceful processes of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, or the murderous examples of Yugoslavia, Sudan and Ethiopia.